Bet and Attack: Incentive Compatible Collaborative Attacks Using Smart Contracts

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GameSec 2021

Blockchain, Smart Contract, and Oracle



Criminal Smart Contract I

Solo Attacker on Real-World Target



Criminal Smart Contract II

Collaborative Attack on Blockchain / Cryptocurrency



Criminal Smart Contract III

Collaborative Attack on Real-World Target



Criminal Smart Contract III

Collaborative Attack on Real-World Target



- *How to measure each attacker's contribution?*

Criminal Smart Contract III

Collaborative Attack on Real-World Target



- *How to measure each attacker's contribution?*
- *When the Attack is successful?*

Attack Model
Use case: Distributed Denial of Service attacks

Phase I:
Design and
Deployment
of CSC

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Phase II:
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Phase III:
Reward
Allocation

Blockchain is (pseudo) anonymous I

Attackers will create multiple address (bets) if it get them more reward

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Private information

The number of attackers n

The amount of their individual bets bet_i

Blockchain is (pseudo) anonymous II

First, in game model we assume they have bet honestly (under one address (one bet)

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First, in game model we assume they have bet honestly (under one address (one bet)

Then, in incentive mechanism model we show why they will bet honestly

Game Model I

Interdependent Attackers Game (IAG)

e_{th}: the total tra c needed for a successful attack

$!_S$: the award of the sponsor

bet_i: the bet value of the i^{th} attacker $bet_{tot} = \sum_{i \in N} bet_i$

$t_i = \frac{bet_i}{!_S}$: the private information that i^{th} attacker has and it represents his type

Game Model II

Interdependent Attackers Game (IAG)

Choice Variable

- e_i: the relative contribution of the i^{th} attacker in e_{th}

$$e_{tot} = \sum_{i \in N} e_i$$

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Model Parameters

- N: the attackers set ($|N| = n$)
- E: the set of all action profiles $\hat{e} = (e_1, \ldots, e_n)$
- T: the set of all type profiles $\hat{t} = (t_1, \ldots, t_n)$

Game Model III

Reward Allocation Function (linear with respect to e_{tot})

$$R(bet_i; e_{tot}) = M \quad e_{tot} \quad \frac{bet_i}{bet_{tot}} \tag{1}$$

$$R(t_i; e_{tot}) = M \quad t_i \quad e_{tot} \quad \frac{bet_{tot}}{! \ s} \quad 1$$

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Cost Function (convex with respect to e_i)

$$C(e_i) = \frac{\exp(e_i) \quad 1}{e_{max} \quad e_i} \qquad 8i = 1; : : : ; n \tag{2}$$

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Utility Function (concave with a unique maximum)

$$U(t_i; e_i; e_{tot}) = R(t_i; e_{tot}) \quad C(e_i) \quad t_i \quad ! \ s \tag{3}$$

Equilibrium Analysis I

Best-response strategy of a rational player in IAG

$$S(t_i; \hat{e}_{-i}) = \arg\max_{e_i \in [0;1]} U(t_i; e_i; \hat{e}_{-i}) \quad (4)$$

$$\frac{\exp(e_i)}{e_{max} - e_i} - c\left[\frac{\exp(e_i) - 1}{(e_{max} - e_i)^2} + \frac{!_S - t_i(!_S + bet_{tot})}{bet_{tot}}\right] = 0 \quad (5)$$

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The only parameters (other than t_i) that determine $S(t_i) = e_i$ are the cost of the required attack c and the quantity $\frac{bet_{tot}}{!_S}$

Equilibrium Analysis II

$S(t_i)$ is a strongly dominant strategy that is the best response regardless of e^A_{-i}

Theorem

IAG has a Strong Dominant Strategy Equilibrium

Equilibrium Analysis III

Now we know

The contribution of each attacker with type t_i: $S(t_i) = e_i$

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$$\sum_{i \in N} S(t_i) = e_{tot}$$

$$p_i(\hat{t}) = R(t_i; AR(\hat{t})) \quad t_i \in S$$

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We need to know

Attacker's true bets

Will attackers bet honestly?

Incentive Mechanism Model I

Mechanism Formulation

$$AR(\hat{t}) = \sum_{i \in N} S(t_i) = \sum_{i \in N} e_i = e_{tot} : \text{Attack Result Function}$$

Incentive Mechanism Model I

Mechanism Formulation

$AR(\hat{t}) = \sum_{i \in N} S(t_i) = \sum_{i \in N} e_i = e_{tot}$: Attack Result Function

$G : T \rightarrow O$: Outcome Function $o = (e_{tot}, \hat{p})$

non-monetary part

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$V(e^{?}_{tot}; t_i) = V(t_i) = (C(S^{?}(t_i)) + k)$: Valuation Function

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$U(t_i; o) = V(t_i) + p_i$

Incentive Mechanism Model II

Theorem

The proposed direct mechanism modeling our CSC-based collaborative attacks is Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible.

Numerical Simulation

Under some mild conditions on the attack cost and total amount of bets, the proposed incentive mechanism provides *individual rationality* and *fair allocation of rewards*

Conclusion

Main Result - CSC-based Collaborative Attack

The attack sponsor can design a **cheat-proof** and **budget-balanced** mechanism to encourage collaboration of selfish rational attackers.

Side Result

The sponsor can predict and adapt the attack result, i.e., determine under what conditions attackers will participate in the attack.

Thank you!

Questions?