
CSE 3400 - Introduction to Computer & Network Security
(aka: Introduction to Cybersecurity)

Lecture 5

Message Authentication Codes

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
From Textbook Slides by Prof. Amir Herzberg

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Outline


- Motivation.
- Message authentication codes (MACs) definition.
- MAC security definition.
- MAC constructions.
- Combining message authentication and encryption.

Encryption Ensures Confidentiality



- ❑ Man-in-the-Middle attacker
'learns nothing' about message

Integrity and Authentication?



- How can the recipient know that the message was not tampered with and it is the original one sent by the sender?

Does Encryption Prevent Forgery?

- ❑ Cannot be guaranteed.
 - ❑ Several secure encryption schemes are malleable (an attacker might be able to alter the ciphertext, and hence, the decrypted plaintext will be different).
- ❑ Clearly not for bitwise stream ciphers (& OTP).
 - ❑ Given $c=m\oplus k$, attacker can send $c\oplus\text{mask}$, to invert any bit in decrypted message.
- ❑ Example, send “Pay Bob \$100” encrypted using OTP.
 - ❑ Eve can change it to “Pay Eve \$100” (note that this is a KPA attacker). How?
 - ❑ Take the ciphertext of the letter “B” above, denote it as $c[4]$.
 - ❑ Note that $c[4] = k[4] \oplus \text{“B”}$ (note that we do know the key!)
 - ❑ Compute a mask that does the following: $c[4] \oplus \text{mask} = k[4] \oplus \text{“E”}$ (this boils down to computing $\text{“B”} \oplus \text{mask} = \text{“E”}$)
 - ❑ Repeat that for the rest of the letters.

Message Authentication Codes (MACs)

- A MAC allows a recipient to **validate** that a message was **not tampered** with and that it was sent by a **key holder**

It is a symmetric key setup!



Key k


$m = \text{"Hi"}, \text{MAC}_k(m)$

Valid MAC \rightarrow Only Sponge and I know k . So he sent m .

Key k

Message Authentication Codes (MACs)

- Use shared key k to authenticate messages
- Pair (tag, m) is valid iff $tag = MAC_k(m)$
- Very efficient
- Does not support non-repudiation!
 - Sponge may say that the key k has been stolen, and so someone else sent the message.



Defining MAC Security

- Following the ‘conservative design principle’:
- Consider most powerful attacker
 - Let attacker receive tag for any message it wants (so it has an oracle access to MAC_k).
- And ‘easiest’ attacker-success criteria
 - Attacker wins if it can produce a valid tag for any message
 - Except for these that the attacker asked to authenticate

MAC Security Definition


Definition . (MAC). An l -bit Message Authentication Code (MAC) over domain D , is a function $F : \{0, 1\}^* \times D \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^l$, such that for all PPT algorithms \mathcal{A} , the advantage $\varepsilon_{F, \mathcal{A}}^{MAC}(n)$ is negligible in n , i.e., smaller than any positive polynomial for sufficiently large n (as $n \rightarrow \infty$), where:

$$\varepsilon_{F, \mathcal{A}}^{MAC}(n) \equiv \Pr_{k \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^n} \left[(m, F_k(m)) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{F_k(\cdot | \text{except } m)}(1^n) \right] - \frac{1}{2^l} \quad (3.1)$$

Where the probability is taken over the random choice of an n bit key, $k \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^n$, as well as over the coin tosses of \mathcal{A} .

On the Use of MACs

- $MAC_k(m)$ may expose information about m !
 - Example: Let MAC be any secure MAC. Define $MAC'_k(m) = MAC_k(m) || Lsb(m)$, where Lsb is least significant bit.
- MAC shows a key-holder computed it
 - Could be any key holder (even recipient)...
- Replay attacks: an old message (and its tag) is being resent.
 - Need to Ensure freshness (more about this later).



Constructing MAC: Three Approaches

1. Design `from scratch`, validate security by failure to cryptanalyze
 - ❑ Huge effort, risk → do only for few `building blocks`
 - ❑ Maybe from EDC (Error Detection Code), but it is not secure for every EDC.
2. Robust combiner of (two) MAC candidates:
 - ❑ $MAC_{k,k'}(m) = f_k(m) || f'_{k'}(m)$, $MAC_{k,k'}(m) = f_k(m) \oplus f'_{k'}(m)$ are secure MAC, if *either* f or f' is a secure MAC.
3. Provable-secure constructions from:
 - ❑ PRF/PRP/Block ciphers (next)
 - ❑ First: PRF/PRP → Fixed-Input-Length (FIL) MAC
 - ❑ Hash functions (later) – even more efficient.

Theorem: every PRF is also a MAC

Let F be a PRF from domain D to range $\{0,1\}^l$.
Then F is also an l -bit MAC for D .

- Proof sketch: construct an attacker against PRF using the attacker against the MAC.
 - For a random function, the outcome of any `new' value is random.
 - So, probability of guessing is 2^{-l} .
 - If a `new' outcome of a PRF can be guessed with significantly higher probability (which is the MAC over a new message), then we can distinguish between it and a random function! ■

Every PRF is also a MAC

- A PRF is a MAC for l -bit messages.
- (l, n) -bit FIL MAC from n -bit PRP (block cipher):
use CBC-MAC – a variant of CBC
 - What standard crypto function can we use as a PRF?
 - A block cipher ? But ...

Using a Block Cipher for MAC

- **Problem 1:** block cipher is PRP, not PRF
 - Solution: the switching lemma says that a PRP is also a PRF !
 - Note: PRP \rightarrow PRF reduction involves loss in concrete security (larger advantage):

$$\left| \varepsilon_{\mathcal{A}, E}^{PRF}(n) - \varepsilon_{\mathcal{A}, E}^{PRP}(n) \right| < \frac{q^2}{2 \cdot |D|}$$

- Some other constructions reduce this loss but we will not discuss them


Using a Block Cipher for MAC

- **Problem 2:** block ciphers are defined only for (short) fixed input length (FIL)
 - Ideally a MAC should work for any input string (Variable Input Length – VIL)
 - We already had a similar problem... where?
 - Block ciphers.
 - We solved by using various encryption modes of operation.
 - A solution for MACs: the CBC-MAC mode of operation!

Cipher Block Chaining MAC: CBC-MAC

Split plaintext m into blocks

Fixed, known (zero)
Initialization Vector (IV)



The tag is the cipher of the last block

$$CBC-MAC_k^E(m_1 || m_2 || \dots || m_l) = E_k(m_l \oplus E_k(\dots E_k(m_1)))$$

Recall: MACs are
deterministic functions

CBC-MAC

- ❑ Widely deployed standard
- ❑ More efficient ‘modes’ exist
 - ❑ E.g., allow for parallel computation.
- ❑ It is also provably secure.

Theorem [BKR94]: if E is a FIL-PRF for domain $\{0,1\}^n$, then $CBC-MAC^E$ is a PRF for domain $\{0,1\}^{ln}$ (for $l > 1$).

- Corollary: ... then $CBC-MAC^E$ is a $\{0,1\}^{ln}$ -MAC

But what of VIL (variable-length input) MAC?

CBC-MAC-based VIL-MAC

- Is CBC-MAC^E a VIL-MAC?

- *No!*

- Ask for $b = \text{CBC-MAC}^E_k(a) = E_k(a)$;

- then output (ac, b) so $m = ac$ with $\text{tag} = b$ where $c = a \oplus b$.

- This is valid, since the attacker did not ask the oracle for a tag for ac and b for ac is a valid tag since

$$\text{CBC-MAC}^E_k(ac) = E_k(c \oplus E_k(a)) = E_k(c \oplus b) = E_k(a \oplus b \oplus b) = E_k(a) = b.$$

- Solution: prepend message length (called CMAC)

- Let $\text{CMAC}^E_k(m) = \text{CBC-MAC}^E_k(L(m) || m)$

- Where $L(m)$ is a 1-block encoding of $|m|$

- CMAC is a secure VIL MAC construction!

Combining Authentication and Encryption

- ❑ For confidentiality, use encryption
- ❑ For authentication, use MAC
- ❑ For both confidentiality and authentication?
 - ❑ Option 1: Combine MAC and encryption
 - ❑ Possible pitfalls (vulnerabilities)
 - ❑ Option 2: authenticated-encryption schemes (or modes)
 - ❑ Easier to deploy (securely)
 - ❑ Generic combination of MAC and Encryption schemes
 - ❑ Or direct combined constructions (can be more efficient)
 - ❑ Might be ad-hoc or rely on complex or less-tested security assumptions.

Generic MAC and Encryption Combinations

- Three standards, three ways...
 - Authenticate and encrypt (A&E):
 - $c = Enc(m), tag = MAC(m), \text{ send } (c, tag)$
 - Authenticate then encrypt (AtE):
 - $tag = MAC(m), c = Enc(m, tag), \text{ send } c$
 - Encrypt then authenticate (EtA):
 - $c = Enc(m), tag = MAC(c), \text{ send } (c, tag)$
- Some of these may be vulnerable even when combining some secure encryption and MAC schemes!

Security of Generic MAC/Enc Combinations

- ❑ A&E may be vulnerable!
 - ❑ Example:
 - ❑ Let MAC be any secure MAC scheme
 - ❑ Let $MAC'_k(m) = MAC_k(m) || \text{lsb}(m)$
 - ❑ MAC' is a secure MAC.
 - ❑ But A&E(m) leaks least significant bit of m (even if the encryption scheme is secure!!!).
 - ❑ Recall that the security guarantee of a MAC is about integrity (or preventing forgery)!
 - ❑ It has nothing to do with confidentiality!
- ❑ What about AtE, EtA ?
 - ❑ AtE: also may be vulnerable (not IND-CPA)!

Security of Generic MAC/Enc Combinations

- How about EtA ? **Provably CCA-Secure [CK01]!**
 - → Secure encryption; otherwise attack Enc(m) by appending MAC
 - → Secure authentication, since any change in (c, MAC(c)) is detected
 - Also: reject fake messages w/o decryption
 - efficiency and foil Denial of Service (DoS), CCA attacks
 - Note: using separate keys for Enc and MAC; what if we use same key?

Keys for MAC and Encryption?

Using same key for MAC+Encryption? Insecure

□ Exercise: show (contrived) examples vulnerabilities:

□ A&E: both vulnerable...

$$E_{k',k''}(m) = E'_{k'}(m) || k''$$
$$MAC_{k',k''}(m) = MAC_{k''}(m) || k'$$

□ AtE: vulnerable authentication (is encryption vulnerable?)

$$E_{k',k''}(m) = E'_{k'}(m) || k''$$

□ EtA: both vulnerable (exercise: attack on authentication)

$$MAC_{k',k''}(m) = MAC_{k''}(m) || k'$$

□ So: should we use two independent keys?

□ Overhead: key generation, transmission, storage

□ Exercise: secure enc+MAC – using a single key!

Solution: $k_{mac} := PRF_k(\text{MAC})$, $k_{enc} := PRF_k(\text{Encrypt})$

Conclusion

- MAC –Message Authentication Code
 - Sender appends `tag` (MAC) to message, recipient verifies tag using shared secret key
- Construction from block cipher
- Next:
 - Crypto-hash functions
 - Constructing MAC from hash function: HMAC

Examples of MAC Constructions

- ❑ On the whiteboard.

Covered Material From the Textbook

- ❑ Chapter 4
 - ❑ All except sections 4.6.3, 4.7.4, and 4.7.5

Thank You!

