CSE 3400: Introduction to Computer & Network Security (or CSE 5850: Introduction to Cybersecurity)

Lecture 1 Introduction

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Outline

- Course logistics and syllabus overview.
- Brief history.
- Cryptography and cybersecurity.
- Background.

History I

- Cryptology "science of secrets".
 - Ancient field, even before computers were invented.
 - Was merely about confidential communication.
 - Mainly about encryption; convert plaintext to ciphertext such that only the intended recipient can correctly decrypt.
 - Cryptography "secret writing" is a more popular term now.
- Kerckhoffs' Principle.
 - Avoid security by obscurity.
 - Instead, cryptographic/security algorithms, schemes, or mechanisms should be public.

History II

- Modern Cryptography.
 - Moved from ad hoc ancient solutions and military secret tools to science/scholarly research/industrial products/etc.
 - Public algorithms.
 - Well defined security notions.
 - Formal security proofs and/or extensive cryptanalysis.

Cryptography is only about secrecy?

- No!! It can achieve a large variety of goals, to name a few:
 - Confidentiality (or secrecy) encryption.
 - Integrity and authenticity message authentication codes and digital signatures.
 - Nonrepudiation digital signatures.
 - Secret key establishment, sharing, and management.
 - Secure function evaluation over private input (two or multi party setup).
 - Computation over encrypted data.
 - etc.

Cybersecurity

- Securing the cyberspace.
 - The cyberspace is the collection of interconnected computers, devices, machines, etc., and the information flow between them.
 - More technological advances ⇒ more critical data can be exchanged ⇒ attackers are more motivated to attack the cyberspace.
 - Resulted in multiple fields, such as:
 - Computer security.
 - Software security.
 - Network security.
 - Information security.

Background - Computational Complexity I

- Mainly we deal efficient or computationally bounded adversaries.
 - The class of PPT (probabilistic polynomial time) algorithms.
 - An algorithm A is in PPT if it takes a polynomial number of steps (in the input size) to terminate.
- A scheme that is secure against PPT adversaries is

computationally secure.

- A scheme is secure if a PPT attacker succeeds with negligible probability.
- This rules out exhaustive search attacks.
 - Infeasible in practice.

Background - Computational Complexity II

- A scheme secure against unbounded attackers is *information theoretically (or unconditionally) secure*.
 - Even if the attacker has unbounded resources (storage, time, etc.), it cannot break the security of the scheme.
- Security parameter.
 - The main factor impacting the run time of cryptographic algorithms.
 - Usually related to the key length.
 - Passed as input to algorithms in unary representation.
 - E.g., a security parameter value is integer l we pass it as 1^{l} .


Security Goals and Definitions I

- Three principles of modern cryptography:
 - Correctness and security definitions (or notions).
 - Define how the scheme should act when used as defined (benign scenario)
 - Define the security goals/requirements/properties that when met the scheme will be secure.
 - This also prevents incorrect use of the scheme.
 - Precise assumptions.
 - Precise definition of attacker capability (but not strategies) we account for.
 - Usually this involves hardness assumptions on which we rely to establish the security of the developed scheme.

Security Goals and Definitions II

- Three principles of modern cryptography (contd.):
 - \circ Formal security proofs.
 - Show how the scheme satisfies the security notion under the used assumptions.
 - For involved systems/protocols, it could be hard to have completely rigorous models and proofs.

An Example - Digital Signatures



- Assumed limitations:
 - Knowledge limitations: key s is secret (unknown to attacker)
 - Resource limitations: can't find key s by trying all keys
- Correctness: any signature produced using S will verify correctly (V will always output OK)
- Security: An attacker cannot forge signatures
 - I.e., find `signature' σ for a new message m s.t. $V_{\mu}(m, \sigma)$ =OK

Concrete and Asymptotic Security

- Concrete security:
 - Measure security in terms of the adversary advantage function value.
 - So it computes a concrete probability value for specific (concrete) parameter values such as key length, number of queries an adversary can perform, etc.
- Asymptotic security:
 - It requires the advantage function to be negligible in the security parameter.
 - I.e., it converges to zero for large enough input values.
 - E.g., a polynomial p(n) is non-negligible while an inverse exponential 2⁻ⁿ is negligible in n.
 - We use NEGL to denote the set of all negligible functions.

Notes - Chapter 1

- Self study.
 - Section 1.3.3 and Appendix A.3 to refresh your knowledge of basic probability.
- For later.
 - Sections 1.3.2 and A.2 (Background on Modular Arithmetic)
 will be covered when we study public key cryptography.
 - Sections 1.3.6 and 1.4 (defining security of digital signatures).
- Table 1.1 under section 1.3.5 includes most of the notations used in the textbook.
 - We will revisit them over and over again while studying the course material.

Notes - Textbook

- You may find some of the concepts mentioned in Chapter 1 hard to comprehend (like section 1.2). These will become much clearer as we progress in the course material.
 - So do not get discouraged!!
- As you may have noticed, the textbook is still a draft version.
 - Prof. Herzberg is still reviewing/editing the textbook.
 - Make sure to fetch the latest version of each chapter as we move forward in the semester.
 - If you find any mistakes or typos, or you have any suggestions or comments, please share them with me to pass them along.

Covered Material From the Textbook

- Chapter 1: all except Sections 1.3.2, 1.3.6 and 1.4.
- Appendix A.3

